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ABSTRACT
 
The present study examined storage and retrieval factors in memoryfor
 
common imagery, in order to determine whether common items benefit storage
 
processes in memory. The variables needed to achieve a commonness effect
 
were identified, which include an unmixed-list design,cued recall, intentional
 
learning, a short presentation rate, and immediate recall. Subjects were
 
presented with 20 noun pairs which were embedded in either common or bizarre
 
sentences. An empirical analysis indicated that a significant commonness effect
 
was achieved. To determine whether this significant commonness effect was
 
due to storage or retrieval factors, Riefer and Rouder's(1992)multinomial model
 
for measuring storage and retrieval was utilized. The model revealed that
 
common items do indeed benefit storage processes in memory. Results are
 
discussed in terms of previousfindings and various theories ofthe bizarreness
 
effect.
 
Ill
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
 
I want to acknowledge and thank Dr. David Riefer, my thesis advisor and
 
academic mentor. This thesis would not have been possible if notfor his
 
patience, encouragement,and guidance. I am grateful. I would also like to
 
thank Dr. Sanders McDougall,whose thoughtful advice was always heeded.
 
Dr. Robert Cramerfor his words of encouragement,and Dr. Chuck Hoffman
 
whose seemingly forgettable commentfour years ago gave me the motivation to
 
succeed.
 
I want to thank my parentsfor their support throughout my graduate
 
training. Thank you to my mother, Mildred Duvall LaMay,who always said that I
 
would fly, and whose constant encouragement,words of wisdom,and selfless
 
determination, made it possible for me to do so. Thank you to myfather. Warren
 
LaMay,whofunded my education by pushing dirt with his tractor. And finally, I
 
want to acknowledge and thank my precious Millie and Will.
 
IV
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
ABSTRACT iii
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
 
LIST OF TABLES vi
 
INTRODUCTION 1
 
Early Attempts to Obtain a Bizarreness Effect 2
 
Recent Attempts to Obtain a Bizarreness Effect 4
 
Theoretical Accounts ofthe Bizarreness Effect 9
 
Riefer and Reader's Multinomial Model 11
 
The Current Study 15
 
METHOD. 17
 
Subjects 17
 
Materials 17
 
Design 18
 
Procedure ^ . . . . . 18
 
RESULTS 19
 
Empirical Analysis. 19
 
Model Analysis . . . 21
 
DISCUSSION 23
 
APPENDIX 30
 
REFERENCES 32
 
LIST OFTABLES
 
Table 1. Proportion of Bizarre and Common
 
Noun-Pairs Recalled 20
 
Table 2. Data Statistics for Bizarre and Common Imagery 22
 
Table 3. Parameter Estimates For the Multinomial Model 24
 
VI
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Bizarre imagery is a mnemonic device that is often used to enhance
 
memory. Several studies have obtained the bizarreness effect, which is the
 
finding that bizarre images are recalled morefrequently than common images
 
(e.g., laccino, Dvorak,& Coler, 1989; McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May,&
 
Brady, 1995). Although bizarre imagery is often thought to be a useful memory
 
aid, in which the subjects themselves often predict that they will recall bizarre
 
images better(Kroll, Jaeger,& Dornfest, 1992), it has also been found that
 
common images can be recalled just as well as, and sometimes better than,
 
bizarre images(Kline & Groninger, 1991; Wollen & Cox, 1981a). This
 
phenomenon is known as the commonness effect.
 
The present experiment examined various theoretical concepts behind the
 
bizarreness and commonness effect. However, it was their relationship to
 
storage and retrieval processes in memory that was of particular interest. Once
 
information is initially encoded,or learned,then the information is stored during
 
the interval between encoding and the time of recall. However, in order to recall
 
the information,Jt must also be retrieved(Smith, 1980). Riefer and Rouder
 
(1992)examined the relationship between storage and retrieval processes in
 
bizarre imagery, utilizing a multinomial modeling analysis, and they established
 
that bizarre images are retrieved better than common images.
 
Although it has been determined that the bizarreness effect benefits
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retrieval(RIefer& Rouder,1992),there is no literature that has specifically
 
investigated the commonness effect, in order to determine whether common
 
sentences benefit the storage of items or their retrieval. In other words, it is
 
uncertain whether common images are stored or retrieved better than bizarre
 
images. When a commonness effect has been found in prior research, it has
 
usually been the unintended result of an initial attempt to obtain a bizarreness
 
effect. Therefore, unlike past research,the present experiment was designed to
 
obtain a commonness effect alone. Once the commonness effect was reached,
 
Riefer and Rouder's(1992)multinomial modeling analysis was applied to
 
determine whether the commonness effect benefitsfrom storage processes in
 
memory.
 
Early Attempts to Obtain the Bizarreness Effect
 
Most early studies on bizarre versus common imageryfocused on the
 
bizarreness effect. It was initially thought that the more bizarre an item is, the
 
easier it is to remember(Lorayne& Lucas, 1974). This idea was not always
 
supported by the early literature, because initial research often failed to find a
 
bizarreness effect(Hauck, Walsh,& Kroll, 1976; Senter& Hoffman, 1976;
 
Webber& Marshall, 1978). For example, Wollen,Webber,and Lowry(1972)
 
attempted to obtain a bizarreness effect, and examined the effects of interaction
 
on bizarreness using pictorial stimuli. Two items in a picture are said to interact
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when they are somehowjoined;for instance, a bizarre interaction between the
 
noun'piano'and 'cigar' mayshow a piano smoking a cigar. After presenting
 
drawings to subject in four different conditions(non-interacting, non-bizarre;
 
non-interacting, bizarre; interacting, non-bizarre, interacting, bizarre), Wollen et
 
al.found that bizarreness had no effect on recall performance. Memoryfor
 
bizarre images was only facilitated to the extent that the image also depicts
 
interaction. Therefore,they concluded that interaction wasthe only effective
 
variable, and there was no significant difference in the recall ofcommon and
 
bizarre imagery.
 
In another early study thatfailed to show a bizarreness effect. Nappe and
 
Wollen(1973)attempted to obtain a bizarreness effect by first having subjects
 
form either common or bizarre images, which they later scored for degree of
 
bizarreness. Theyfound no difference in common versus bizarre images;
 
however, bizarre images took longer than common imagesfor the subjects to
 
form. It wasfound that experience had no effect on forming bizarre images,
 
other than increasing the speed of imageryformation. Nappe and Wollen
 
concluded that this failure to obtain a bizarreness effect may have been due to
 
the subjects' lack of experience in using mental imagery.
 
In an early experimentthat did find the bizarreness effect, Andreoff and
 
Yarmey(1976)noted that, in most research, bizarre imagery has little influence
 
on immediate recall of paired associates; therefore, they tested the effects of
 
bizarreness on delayed recall. Theyfound that bizarreness does affect recall,
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but only in a delayed(24 hour)condition. This was explained in terms ofa
 
cognitive elaboration hypothesis, in which bizarre imagery leads to novel
 
cognitive elaborations which are more distinguishable than common
 
elaborations. The bizarre elaborations,due to their novelty, may lead to less
 
inter-pair interference, and therefore,a greater resistance to forgetting.
 
Although Andreoff and Yarmey(1976)found a bizarreness effect, most
 
early research on bizarre imagery failed to find a bizarreness effect, and
 
sometimes instead found that common items are remembered better(Collyer,
 
Jonides,& Bevan,1972; Emmerich &Acherman, 1979). It became increasingly
 
apparent that common items can bejust as effective in memory as bizarre items.
 
Recent Attempts to Obtain the Bizarreness Effect
 
Following early failures to obtain a bizarreness effect, more recent
 
research has established that there are several specific variables that can be
 
manipulated in order to achieve this effect(Einstein & McDaniel, 1987). List-

type became an important variable after initial research, which focused on
 
unmixed-list designs, consistently failed to reach a bizarreness effect. An
 
unmixed-list, in which one group of subjects receives a list of only bizarre
 
sentences, and another group of subjects receives only common sentences,fails
 
to produce a bizarreness effect(Collyer et al., 1972). The literature instead
 
shows that a mixed-list design, in which subjects are presented with both bizarre
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and common sentences,facilitates the bizarreness effect(McDaniel& Einstein,
 
1986; PraBaldi, DeBeni, Cornoldi,& Cavedon, 1985). The subject may not
 
identify a sentence as bizarre unless he or she also sees the other sentences in
 
a common format. Therefore,the bizarreness effect is enhanced only in the
 
context ofcommon sentences. Cox and Wollen(1981)attempted to contradict
 
past research,and examined whether they could achieve a bizarreness effect
 
when using an unmixed-list design. Theyfound no significant difference
 
between bizarre and common conditions. The bizarre conditions produced lower
 
recall of complete sentences;thus they concluded that bizarreness is onlyfound
 
in mixed-list designs.
 
Cued recall versusfree recall is another determinant ofthe bizarreness
 
and commonness effect. In a free recall paradigm,subjects are asked to recall
 
both items in a noun-pair without a cue, versus a cued recall paradigm in which
 
the first noun in a noun-pair is given. Early research only examined cued recall,
 
and did not get the bizarreness effect(Hauck et al., 1976). However, more
 
recent research has consistentlyfound that, especially when paired with a
 
mixed-list design,the bizarreness effect is obtained with free recall, but not with
 
cued recall(McDaniel& Einstein, 1986; Merry, 1980). Wollen and Cox(1981b)
 
examined the bizarreness effect in a multi-trial learning task, and tested subjects
 
in eitherfree or cued recall conditions. Theyfound that in free recall, bizarre
 
materials produced significantly greater recall than common materials, and in
 
cued recall, common materials produced consistently greater recall.
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Wollen and Cox(1981a)also examined whether blzarreness Is effective
 
only with free recall, and discovered a potential cueing effect in bizarre
 
sentences that is not present in common sentences. For example,the two
 
common sentences,'The hen pecked the worm,'and'The man smoked the
 
cigar,'can be changed to bizarre sentences such as'The man pecked the
 
worm,'and'The hen smoked the cigar.' In a free recall paradigm, if a subject
 
first recalls the sentence,'The hen smoked the cigar,' this may cue the second
 
sentence, because the word 'hen' may cue the word'worm,'which is part ofthe
 
common sentence. Wollen and Cox(1981a)speculated that this subject-

supplied intersentence cueing may be the cause ofthe blzarreness effect, rather
 
than the mixed-list,free recall paradigm.
 
As indicated earlier, another variable that can be manipulated in order to
 
obtain the blzarreness effect is delay of recall. Andreoff and Yarmey(1976)
 
tested subjects with either immediate recall or recall after a 24-hour delay.
 
There was no difference between common and bizarre imagery in immediate
 
recall, but there was an advantagefor bizarre imagery with delayed recall.
 
O'Brien and Wolford(1982)also examined the effects of delay on recall of noun
 
pairs in both common and bizarre paradigms. Theyfound that after a one-week
 
delay,the blzarreness effect wasfacilitated. However, after a three-day delay,
 
there was no difference in commonness and blzarreness.
 
Early research thatfailed to obtain a blzarreness effect used intentional
 
learning tasks, in which the researchers told the subjects that there would be a
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memory test. However, recent research has utilized incidental learning tasks,
 
which aid the bizarreness effect. In an incidental learning task, subjects are not
 
told that the experiment involves a memory test. Instead, subjects are told that
 
the task ofthe experiment is to observe sentences,and then to rate them,on a
 
scale ofone to five,for either imagery(Cox& Wollen, 1981), bizarreness
 
(McDaniel& Einstein, 1989), or vividness(laccino et al., 1989). This is followed
 
by a surprise memory test. An intentional learning task often decreases the
 
bizarreness effect(ColIyer et al., 1972; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979). However,
 
this is not always the case;some research has obtained a commonness effect
 
when using incidental learning rather than intentional learning(PraBaldi et al.,
 
1985; Wollen & Cox, 1981a).
 
As mentioned earlier, when researchers use incidental learning to obtain
 
a bizarreness effect, they typically have subjects rate stimuli on vividness,
 
bizarreness, or interactiveness. Research shows that having subjects rate the
 
vividness of their imagery produces the strongest bizarreness effect. McDaniel
 
and Einstein(1986)found that rating imagesfor vividness showed a bizarreness
 
effect with an intervening list ofcommon images, but not with an intervening list
 
of bizarre images,or an intervening list of semantically related words. In a
 
similar study, Kroll, Schepeler, and Angin(1986)failed to find a significant
 
bizarreness effect, but they too showed an increase in bizarre imagery following
 
a vividness rating task. Subjects were asked to first image,and then rate
 
sentencesfor bizarreness, vividness, and/or interaction. Subjects recalled more
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bizarre sentencesfollowing the vividness rating task, but not the bizarreness or
 
interaction rating tasks. Kroll et al.(1986)suggested that rating sentences in
 
three separate tasks may inadvertently lead subjects into semantic processing,
 
rather than imagery processing. Also,there may have been a difference in
 
encoding strategies between high and low-imagers, with high-ability imagers
 
encoding pictorial stimuli literally, which leads to more accurate encoding
 
(O'Brien & Wolford, 1982).
 
The occasional failure to obtain a bizarreness effect even when using free
 
recall and a within-subjects design may be due to sentence complexity
 
(McDaniel& Einstein, 1989). McDaniel and Einstein stated that increased
 
sentence complexity decreases the level of imageability, and when rating
 
images,complex sentences produce a significantly lower image rating than do
 
short, plausible sentences. Complex sentences may cause subjects to produce
 
more elaboration ofthe target nouns, but their memory is not enhanced unless
 
the elaboration makes the relationship between the target nouns less arbitrary.
 
McDaniel and Einstein found that memoryfor bizarre imagery is facilitated when
 
sentences are simple, and that the advantage of bizarre imagery is eliminated
 
when sentences are complex.
 
A recent experiment on bizarre imagery also examined sentence
 
complexity. Robinson-Riegler and McDaniel(1994)examined why the
 
mnemonic benefit of bizarreness is notfound when additional modifiers of nouns
 
are added into the stimuli. The bizarreness ofthe complex sentences was not
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utilized by subjects during retrieval, and the cuesfor complex sentences were
 
more precise than the cues associated with bizarre sentences. It was
 
determined that simple, unelaborated sentences aided the bizarreness effect,
 
and complex sentences containing additional modifiers of nouns did not.
 
Therefore,the bizarreness effect is weaker when sentences are complex.
 
Bizarreness and commonness are not only affected by sentence
 
complexity, but also by presentation time. Due to the novelty of bizarre
 
sentences,they take a relatively longer amount oftime to process than common
 
sentences. Kline and Groninger(1991)examined presentation rates and their
 
effect on bizarre imagery,and found that a short presentation rate(11 seconds)
 
facilitated common sentences,and a longer presentation rate(15seconds)
 
facilitated bizarre sentences.
 
Theoretical Accounts ofthe Bizarreness Effect
 
It is apparent that the bizarreness effect is a well established
 
phenomenon,with specific variables that have been identified to obtain this
 
effect. Based on this research, it is clear that we know how to find a bizarreness
 
effect. However,thus far, only methodological considerations ofthe bizarreness
 
effect have been discussed;there are also theoretical considerations.
 
Thefollowing theories, proposed by Einstein and McDaniel(1987)
 
provide possible explanationsfor cognitive processes important to the
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bizarreness effect. Their attentional hypothesis states that bizarre sentences
 
arouse attention and interest due to their novelty(Merry, 1980), and therefore
 
receive a greater amount of processing than common sentences, which
 
improves memory. This potentially explains why the bizarreness effect occurs in
 
mixed-lists and not unmixed-lists. In a mixed-list, subjects mayfocus their
 
attention on the bizarre sentences; however, in an unmixed-list, subjects devote
 
their full attention to whatever sentence they are presented with, whether it be
 
bizarre or common(Wollen & Cox,1981a). Therefore,the context ofcommon
 
images is necessary in order to focus attention on bizarre images.
 
Einstein and McDaniel(1987)also discuss the distinctiveness hypothesis,
 
which states that the distinctiveness of an event is determined by its relation to
 
other encoded events. They state that bizarre images usually depict more
 
exaggerated, distorted, or unusual relationships among objects, and are, by
 
definition, more distinctive than common images. The distinctiveness of an
 
event can be determined by two factors. First, the distinctive items sharesfew
 
features in common with other information in memory,which is true of bizarre
 
items. The second factor asserts that distinctiveness is defined in a relative
 
manner, in which the uniqueness ofthe event is determined by its relationship
 
relative to other items in the list. Therefore, bizarre materials should produce
 
encodings that are relatively more distinctive in the context ofcommon materials
 
that in the context of bizarre materials. This explains why the bizarreness effect
 
occurs in mixed-list designs, and not in unmixed-list designs(McDaniel&
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Einstein, 1991).
 
The retrieval inhibition hypothesis(Einstein & McDaniel, 1987)states that
 
the retrieval of one item in a list may inhibit the retrieval of other items in the
 
same list. In other words,strong items block the access to weak items. This
 
hypothesis states that bizarre images have a better representation in memory
 
than common images,and because of this, bizarre images block the retrieval of
 
common images. This is especially true in mixed-list designs.
 
Riefer and Rouder(1992)reviewed these theories and framed them in
 
terms ofstorage and retrieval processes. For instance,the attentional
 
hypothesis is a storage-based explanation ofthe commonness effect, and the
 
retrieval inhibition hypothesis uses retrieval factors to explain the bizarreness
 
effect. According to Riefer and Rouder,evidence for the retrieval explanation of
 
the bizarreness effect occurs because memoryfor bizarre imagery is enhanced
 
byfree recall and not cued recall. This occurs because cued recall tends to
 
lessen the importance of retrieval processes.
 
Riefer and Rouder's Multinomial Model
 
In order to examine storage and retrieval processes in bizarre imagery,
 
Riefer and Rouder(1992)developed a mathematical model,known as a
 
multinomial model,to measure unobservable cognitive events. To measure
 
these processes,subjects engage in a standard paired-associate paradigm in
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which two capitalized nouns(the stimulus and response)are embedded within a
 
common or a bizarre sentence. The subject is told to form an image between
 
the two nouns in each sentence, in order to recall them in a memory test which
 
follows presentation ofthe sentences. The subjects are then tested in both a
 
free recall,followed by a cued recall memory test. For instance, subjects may be
 
given the bizarre sentence. The MAN was wearing the CHAIR.' In the cued
 
recall condition, the subject is given the word'MAN,'and is asked to recall the
 
word'CHAIR,'and in a free recall paradigm,the subject is asked to recall both
 
'MAN'and'CHAIR,'without any cues.
 
From this standard testing procedure,free-recall responses fall into three
 
categories: subjects freely recall both words,they recall the stimulus or
 
response term (but not both), or they recall neither term. In cued recall, subjects
 
either recall the response or they do not recall it. From this information a
 
statistical model can be developed, based on five statistical parameters, which
 
can determine whether recall ofthe bizarre items is due to retrieval and whether
 
recall ofthe common items is due to storage.
 
The multinomial modeling analysis evolves statistically from the analysis
 
ofsix separate recall events:
 
- both itemsfreely recalled, correct cued-recall;
 
Eg - one and only one item freely recalled, correct cued-

recall;
 
Eg - neither item freely recalled, correct cued-recall;
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 E4- both items freely recalled, incorrect cued-recall;
 
Eg-one and only one item freely recalled, incorrect cued recall;
 
Eg - neither item freely recalled, incorrect cued-recall.
 
The probability ofthese six recall events can be obtained through a
 
statistical analysis which begins with the following hypothetical cognitive events,
 
represented by parameters a, r^, rg, s^, S2 in the model. These cognitive events
 
are:
 
a - probability offorming and storing a stimulus-response association;
 
- retrieval ofthe association during free-recall;
 
r2 - retrieval ofthe association during cued-recall;
 
51 - probability that exactly one item in a pair is recalled independently during
 
free-recall;
 
52 - probability of singleton recall of non-retrieved associates.
 
Ofthese five items,the two that are most important to the present experiment
 
are a, which measures storage, and r^, which measures retrieval. The remaining
 
parameters, r2, s^, and S2, are less important to the storage and retrieval issues,
 
and are considered nuisance variables.
 
From these five parameters,the probabilities for each data event can be
 
established using the following formulas:
 
P(E,)= ar/2,
 
P(E2)= a(1-r,)r2S^,
 
P(E3)= a(1-f,)r2(1-s,),
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 P{E,)= ar,{1-r,),
 
P{Es)= a(1-r^)(1-r2)s,+(1-a)S2,
 
P{Ee)= a{^-r,){^-r,){^-s,)H^-a){^-s,).
 
Once the probabilities are established,the closed-form solutions for the
 
parameters are then determined:
 
a =[{Ni+N2+N3){Ni+N4)]/NNi,
 
r, = NAN1+N2+N2),
 
r2 =NANi+N,),
 
s, = N^iN^+Ns),
 
S2 ={N,Ns-N2N,)/mNs+Ne)-N,{N2+N2)].
 
In these closed form solutions, A/, is the frequency ofthe £,events,and
 
A/, — A/j+A/2+/V3+A/^+/Vg+A/g.
 
In observing the model, it can be seen there are five parameters as well
 
asfive independent data events. This leaves no degrees offreedom in which to
 
test the goodness offit to the model. In order to free up one degree offreedom,
 
it is possible to set parameters s,and S2(the singleton parameters)equal to
 
each other(i.e., = S2). This is an acceptable solution in many situations
 
because both ofthese parameters represent recalling individual items that were
 
not recalled as word pairs. The unrestricted version ofthe model, in which
 
and S2represent two separate events, is known as case I; the restricted version
 
ofthe model,in which = S2, is known as case II.
 
Riefer and Rouder(1992)used their multinomial model to determine the
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cognitive processes that facilitate the bizarreness effect. Subjects were
 
presented with both bizarre and common sentences utilizing a mixed list design,
 
and an incidental learning task. Riefer and Rouder had subjects rate the
 
sentencesfor vividness, and presented subjects with a free recall,followed by a
 
cued recall memory test. The bizarreness effect wasfound in two ofthree
 
variations of this experiment. The multinomial modeling analysis wasthen used
 
to determine whether this effect was due to storage or retrieval. It wasfound
 
that in the two experiments,subjects retrieved significantly more bizarre than
 
common noun-pairs. Therefore, bizarre sentences benefited from retrieval, and
 
notfrom storage processes in memory.
 
The Current Study
 
In their research on bizarre imagery, Riefer and Rouder(1992)applied
 
their multinomial modeling technique and found,as they hypothesized,that the
 
bizarreness effect is indeed due to higher rates of retrieval in memory. They
 
focused on storage and retrieval processes in bizarre imagery; however,the
 
commonness effect was not of primary interest in their study. Therefore,they
 
found that neither bizarre sentences, nor common sentences benefited from
 
storage within memory. This thesis examined the role of different cognitive
 
processes in memory,but more specifically, it determined the relationship
 
between common items and storage processes in memory. It is reasonable to
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theorize that common Items benefit storage because, unlike bizarre items which
 
are often difficult to relate to, common items are easy to relate to, making them
 
easier to store into memory.
 
Ofcourse, in any study, to determine if common images are stored better
 
in memory,one mustfirst obtain a commonness effect. Past research focused
 
almost exclusively on obtaining the bizarreness effect. As mentioned earlier,
 
many ofthe studies often found the commonness effect instead, even though
 
this was not the initial purpose ofthose studies. Rather than attempt to obtain a
 
bizarreness effect, the present study was designed to obtain a commonness
 
effect in order to determine if the effect was due to storage or retrieval. This
 
attempt to obtain a commonness effect was unique to the present experiment,
 
and has not been done in past research.
 
To obtain the commonness effect, none ofthe methods previously
 
discussed to obtain the bizarreness effect were utilized. Instead, opposite
 
methodologies than those used to obtain a bizarreness effect were used. The
 
methodologies utilized in the present experiment included an unmixed-list design
 
(Collyer et al., 1972; Emmerich &Acherman, 1979), using both free as well as
 
cued recall(PraBaldi et al., 1985; Wollen & Cox,1981a, 1981b), using
 
intentional learning in which subjects are told that there will be a memory test
 
(Collyer et al., 1972; Emmerich &Ackerman,1979; Wollen & Cox,1981b), using
 
a short(10second)presentation rate(Kline & Groninger, 1991),and using
 
immediate recall(O'Brien & Wolford, 1982). Once the present study reached
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the commonness effect, Riefer and Rouder's(1992)multinomial modeling
 
analysis was applied in order to analyze storage processes in memory.
 
Given these methodologies,we expected to obtain a commonness effect, with
 
results indicating that the commonness effect was due to storage.
 
METHOD
 
Subjects
 
Subjects consisted of75 male and female undergraduate studentsfrom
 
the University of California at Irvine, each receiving extra course creditfor their
 
participation.
 
Materials
 
Subjects were presented with 20sentences. Each sentence contained a
 
noun-pair(e.g. BANKER-NEWSPAPER)which described either a bizarre
 
relationship or a common relationship between two objects. An example ofa
 
common sentence for the noun-pair BANKER-NEWSPAPER wasThe'BANKER
 
read the NEWSPAPER;'its corresponding bizarre sentence was'The BANKER
 
floated on the NEWSPAPER.' The noun-pairs were capitalized within each
 
sentence. Most ofthe sentences were modifications ofthose used by McDaniel
 
and Einstein(1986)and Riefer and Rouder(1992),and the full set ofsentences
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is listed in the Appendix.
 
Design
 
The experimental design utilized in the experiment was a2X2 mixed
 
design. The first independent variable was type ofsentence(bizarre vs.
 
common),and wasthe between-subjects variable. Sentences were either all
 
common or all bizarre, with 38subjects receiving common sentences and 37
 
subjects receiving bizarre sentences. The second independent variable was
 
type of recall. Recall was eitherfree or cued,and wasthe within-subjects
 
variable.
 
Procedure
 
Subjects were run in six groups ranging from 10to 14 people each.
 
Sentences were presented on slides projected onto a screen in front of subjects
 
at a rate of 10s per sentence. Sentences were presented one at a time, in
 
random order, to each set of subjects.
 
Following presentation ofthe sentences,subjects were given a three min
 
distractor task in which they circled small differences between pairs of nearly
 
identical pictures. Subjects were then given a three min free recall period in
 
which they recalled both the stimulus and response items onto a blank piece of
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paper. Subjects were instructed to recall both Items ofeach noun-pair, and if
 
they could not remember both items,they were asked to write down what
 
items they did remember. Immediately following the free recall portion was the
 
cued recall portion, in which the stimulus ofeach pair was presented in random
 
order on a single sheet of paper. It wasthe subjects' responsibility to recall the
 
second item in each noun-pair. The cued portion also lasted three minutes.
 
RESULTS
 
Empirical analysis
 
All statistical tests were conducted using the.05 level of significance.
 
Table 1 presents the proportion of bizarre and common noun-pairs correctly
 
recalled in both free and cued recall conditions. Free recall was measured in
 
terms ofthe number of noun-pairs in which at least one item wasfreely recalled.
 
Cued recall was measured in terms ofthe number of correct responses to the
 
second noun when the first noun was given as a cue(cf. Riefer& Rouder, 1992).
 
An analysis of variance revealed that there wasa significant difference in
 
subjects' recall of bizarre and common sentences, with subjects recalling more
 
common sentences than bizarre sentences, F{^,73)= 12.46. In addition.
 
subject^recalled more items during cued recall than during free recall.
 
F(1,73)=202.35 As Table 1 indicates, there wasa slight commonness effect
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Table 1 
Proportion ofBizarre and Common Noun-Pairs Recalled 
Sentence 
Free 
Recall 
Cued 
Recall 
Bizarre 
Common 
.46(.13) 
.55(.13) 
.67(.23) 
.82(.15) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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in the free recall condition, with an even greater advantage for common items in
 
the cued recall condition. However,this interaction between item type and type
 
of recall failed to reach significance, F{^,73)= 2.69.
 
Model analysis
 
Riefer and Rouder's(1992)multinomial modeling analysis was applied in
 
order to determine whether the advantages ofcommon imagery were due to
 
storage or retrieval processes in memory. In order to determine this, it was
 
necessary to first calculate the A/,statistics. These statistics are presented in
 
Table 2, with an N of740for the bizarre condition, and 760for the common
 
condition.
 
Riefer and Batchelder(1988)describe how the loglikelihood ratio statistic
 
can be used to evaluate the fit ofthe multinomial models. According to Riefer
 
and Rouder(1992),the model can be analyzed through either case I or case II
 
of the model. Case I utilizes all five parameters(a, r^, rj, s^, Sj), while case II
 
assumes that s^= Sj, and thus utilizes onlyfour parameters(a, r^, rj, s). This
 
frees up one degree offreedom for testing the model. The statistic is
 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable, and a critical value of5.99
 
was utilized based on two degrees offreedom. To test the goodness offit in the
 
present experiment,case II of the model was applied to the data set, which
 
resulted in a significantly poor fit, G^(2)=20.26. Therefore,case I ofthe model
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Table2
 
Data Statistics for Bizarre and Common Imagery
 
Sentence A/j A/j A/^ A/j A/g
 
Bizarre 294 13 186 3 36 208
 
Common 391 4 223 2 14 126
 
Note. = both Itemsfreely recalled, correct cued recall; A/2= one and only one
 
item freely recalled, correct cued recall; A/3= neither item freely recalled, correct
 
cued recall; N4= both itemsfreely recalled. Incorrect cued recall; A/g = one and
 
only one item freely recalled. Incorrect cued recall; and A/g = neither item freely
 
recalled, incorrect cued recall.
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was utilized for all subsequent data analyses.
 
The parameter estimatesfrom case I of the model are presented in Table
 
3. The values of rz are relatively high, which indicates that the storage ofa
 
noun-pair generally resulted in correct cued recall for that pair. However,the
 
free-recall retrieval differences, which are indicated by r^, are more pertinent to
 
the present experiment. Common and bizarre sentences did not significantly
 
differ on their retrievability, as measured by parameter r^, )= 1.53. The
 
storage parameter, represented by a, is also highly pertinent to the present
 
experiment. Table3indicates that the storage difference showed an advantage
 
for common items over bizarre items(.82 versus.67 respectively), and this effect
 
reached statistical significance, G^(1)=40.47. The only other significantfinding
 
was that parameter S|showed a significant bizarreness effect, G^(1)=6.53.
 
Parameter wasa nuisance variable, and its results were not pertinent to the
 
present experiment. However, incorporates both storage and retrieval
 
processes, which indicates that this may be due to a type I error. The Sz statistic
 
also showed a slight, but nonsignificant, bizarreness effect, G^(1)= 1.81.
 
DISCUSSION
 
The bizarreness and commonness effects can now be explained in terms
 
ofa two-factor explanation involving storage and retrieval. Riefer and Rouder
 
(1992)established that bizarre images benefitfrom retrieval processes in
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Table3
 
ParameterEstimates Forthe Multinomial Model
 
Sentence a r^
 
Bizarre .67 .60 .99 .07 .15
 
Common .82 .63 .99 .02 .10
 
Note, a = probability of storing the association; = probability of retrieving the
 
association in free recall; r2= probability of retrieving the association in cued
 
recall; s^ = probability of recalling a non-retrieved associate as a singleton;
 
S2= probability of recalling a non-associated item as a singleton.
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memory. Results ofthe present experiment Indicate that common images
 
benefitfrom superior storage processes in memory. Before examining the
 
storage and retrieval aspects ofthe study,the variables necessary to obtain a
 
commonness effectfirst had to be identified. This seemingly straightforward
 
task was actually quite complicated since past research had not specifically
 
examined the commonness effect. McDaniel and Einstein(1991)previously
 
identified a mixed-list design, and free recall as variables needed to reach a
 
bizarreness effect. The present study also identified incidental learning, delayed
 
recall, and a long presentation rate. It was theorized that by reversing them,a
 
commonness effect should be obtained. Therefore,the variables that were
 
manipulated in order to reach a commonness effect were an unmixed-list design,
 
cued recall, intentional learning, immediate recall, and a short presentation rate.
 
After a significant commonness effect was reached, it wasthen possible to
 
utilize Riefer and Rouder's(1992)multinomial modeling analysis in order to
 
determine whether common items benefit storage or retrieval processes in
 
memory.
 
The results ofthe empirical analyses were as hypothesized, with subjects
 
recalling significantly more common sentences than bizarre sentences. The
 
significant advantage ofcued recall overfree recall was an expected finding,
 
and is consistent with previous research(Wollen & Cox, 1981b). Riefer and
 
Rouder(1992)produced a significant bizarreness effectforfree recall, butfailed
 
to show an advantage for bizarre imagery in cued recall. The present results are
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an extension ofthose findings, and verify that there is an advantage for common
 
imagery in cued recall(Emmerich &Acherman,1979; O'Brien & Wolford, 1982;
 
Wollen & Cox, 1981a).
 
It was only after a significant commonness effect was reached that we
 
could examine the storage and retrieval parameters by utilizing Riefer and
 
Rouder's(1992)multinomial model. The A/,statistics indicate that there was a
 
commonness effectfor (294for bizarre and 391 for common),the statistic that
 
measures when both items are freely recalled, with correct cued recall. In
 
addition, the parameter estimates show that there was a significant advantage
 
for common items in storage parameter a. Thus, Riefer and Rouder's(1992)
 
multinomial model provided a good fit to the data and supported the hypothesis
 
that common items benefit storage.
 
The two-factor theory helps to explain why the bizarreness effect is weak
 
or nonexistent in prior research. Since common items are stored better, they
 
may tend to neutralize the retrieval advantage of bizarre imagery,and thus
 
weaken or eliminate the bizarreness effect in many experiments. The two-factor
 
theory also explains why the bizarreness effect is not usuallyfound in cued
 
recall. In a cued recall paradigm,the first word ofa word pair is given, and it is
 
the subjects' responsibility to identify the second word. Presenting subjects with
 
a cue minimizes retrieval, and thus neutralizes the bizarreness effect.
 
The two-factor theory can explain why the commonness effect is stronger
 
with intentional learning. In an intentional learning paradigm subjects are told
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that there will be a memory test, unlike an incidental learning paradigm in which
 
subjects are not told of an impending memory test. When subjects are told that
 
there will be a memory test, they may make an attempt to remember items by
 
utilizing various memorization techniques,thus storing the items better. This
 
should benefit memoryfor common imagery.
 
Immediate recall benefits the commonness effect because storage of
 
information should be best immediately after list presentation. However,delayed
 
recall should benefit the bizarreness effect because presumably after a long
 
delay,the bizarre items should come more readily to mind than the common
 
items, and thus be retrieved better. This supportsfindings by O'Brien and
 
Wolford(1982)who examined delay of recall and the bizarreness effect. They
 
found that the bizarreness effect is facilitated after a one-week delay, and there
 
was no difference between commonness and bizarreness after a three-day
 
delay. The present experiment extends those findings by identifying an
 
advantage for common items with an immediate recall test. An area offuture
 
research could be to examine delay of recall with a recall of less than three
 
days.
 
The two-factor explanation is consistent with current theory on storage
 
and retrieval processes. For example,thefact that bizarre imagery is retrieved
 
better is consistent with the distinctiveness hypothesis(Einstein & McDaniel,
 
1987),which states that bizarre images are more distinctive than common
 
images due to their unusual or exaggerated relationships among objects.
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McDaniel et al.(1995)state how the distinctiveness hypothesis can be explained
 
in terms of retrieval processes in memory. The bizarre items are more distinctive
 
and tend to stand out more, making them easier to retrieve. In addition, Nappe
 
and Wollen(1973)found that bizarre images take longer toform than common
 
images,and the extra processing that is required for bizarre imagery provides an
 
explanation for a storage disadvantage in bizarre imagery.
 
Common items are more easily stored because they are easy to relate to,
 
they are more easily integrated, and they require less distinctive elaborations
 
(Andreoff&Yarmey,1976; Wollen & Cox, 1981b). Unlike bizarre sentences,
 
which are unusual by nature, the common sentences are not unusual,and are
 
easy to relate to, thus making them less distinctive. Distinctiveness is
 
determined both in relation to the context in which an item is presented,as well
 
as to a subject's prior knowledge ofthe item(McDaniel et al., 1995). Since
 
common items are consistent with a subjects existing schema,this indicates that
 
a storage advantage may occur because subjects rely on their existing schema
 
or prior knowledge ofthe common items(Bransford & Franks, 1971, 1972;
 
Bransford & Johnson, 1973). This makes storage ofcommon sentences easier
 
than bizarre sentences.
 
The question can be raised whether item differences possibly accountfor
 
the results of this experiment. The present study utilized a between-subject
 
design,'and therefore different subjects saw different sentences. It is possible
 
that the common items may have been recalled better, not because ofthe
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commonness effect, but because the common sentences were easier due to item
 
differences between each set ofsentences. This possibility is not likely,
 
however, because the sentences utilized in the present experiment were based
 
on the same sentences previous researchers have used to successfully obtain a
 
bizarreness effect(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986; Riefer & Rouder, 1992). It should
 
be pointed out that six new sentences were constructed specifically for the
 
present experiment. To determine whether these new sentences created any
 
item differences, an analysis was conducted comparing the proportion correct of
 
the20sentences used in the experiment with the proportion correct ofthe 14
 
sentences, which excluded the six created by the experimenter. This new
 
proportion correct was essentially unchanged in all experimental conditions.
 
Therefore, use ofthe six sentences did not alter the results, and does not
 
accountfor the recall advantage ofthe common sentences.
 
The present experiment has provided a plausible explanation for the
 
bizarreness and commonness effect. The inconsistencies of past research on
 
the bizarreness effect can be explained with a simple two-factor theory that
 
identifies a storage advantage for common imagery and a retrieval advantage for
 
bizarre imagery. Although the present study has determined that common items
 
benefit storage,the commonness effect itself has not been studied extensively.
 
The present experiment, by determining the storage and retrieval parameters to
 
explain the effect, has provided future researchers with a model to further
 
examine common imagery.
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APPENDIX
 
Common and Bizarre Sentences
 
The HORSE ate the HAY.
 
THE HORSE smoked the HAY.
 
The BOYfed the CAT.
 
The BOYjuggled the CAT.
 
The GIRL kissed the DOLL.
 
The GIRL boiled the DOLL.
 
The CAR drove pastthe FENCE.
 
The CAR was petting the FENCE.
 
The GOLDFISH wasswimming in the BOWL.
 
The GOLDFISH was eating out ofthe BOWL.
 
The LAMP shined on the BOOK.
 
The LAMP read the BOOK.
 
The WOLF howled at the MOON.
 
The WOLF lassoed the MOON.
 
The MAID spilled the AMMONIA.
 
The MAID drank the AMMONIA.
 
The SUN set in the WEST.
 
The SUN did back flips in the WEST.
 
The DOG chased the BICYCLE.
 
The DOG rode the BICYCLE.
 
The SNOWFLAKE fell on the MOUNTAIN.
 
TheSNOWFLAKE climbed the MOUNTAIN.
 
The DOCTOR read the JOURNAL.
 
The DOCTOR burned the JOURNAL.
 
The SHOES were placed by the MILK.
 
The SHOES were filled with MILK.
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The COCKROACH appeared on the STOVE
 
The COCKROACH moved the STOVE.
 
The BANKERfolded the NEWSPAPER.
 
The BANKERfloated on the NEWSPAPER.
 
The SPIDER crawled on the SIDEWALK.
 
The SPIDER watered the SIDEWALK.
 
The NURSE worked at the COMPUTER.
 
The NURSE danced on the COMPUTER.
 
The SOLDIER was sitting in the CHAIR.
 
The SOLDIER was wearing the CHAIR.
 
ThePERFORMER sang for the AUDIENCE.
 
ThePERFORMER ate the AUDIENCE.
 
The PLANT rested on top ofthe TELEVISION.
 
The PLANTscreamed atthe TELEVISION.
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